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Towards an Economic Theory of Islamic Finance Regulation 
 
 
Mabid Ali M. M. Al-Jarhi1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Islamic finance has several comparative advantages over conventional finance. Since 
they are related to efficiency, stability and other macroeconomic benefits, they 
cannot be easily internalized by Islamic bankers. Islamic bankers have no incentive 
to stick to the Islamic finance paradigm and instead tend to mimic conventional 
finance. Regulation is therefore required to modify their behavior in order to allow 
the Islamic finance industry to enjoy its advantages. This paper attempts modify the 
economic theory of bank regulations towards that aim.  
 
Keywords: Islamic banking, Islamic finance, Islamic monetary and financial 
economics, regulations banking, finance 
 
Why Islamic Bankers Ignore the Advantages of Islamic Finance? 
 
Appendix I elaborates the comparative advantages of Islamic finance. The 
behavior of Islamic bankers without proper regulations tends to mimic the behavior 
of their conventional counterpart, thereby nullifying many of the advantages of 
Islamic finance. While conventional finance can be associated with instability and 
inefficiency, conventional bankers find their financing procedures to be sufficiently 
streamlined and cost-effective. Islamic finance applications based on multiplicity of 
contracts and their mixing and matching in comparison appear cumbersome and 
costly. The advantages of Islamic finance come through external and sometimes long-
term effects that are not internalized by Islamic bankers. 
 
Islamic bankers would therefore find it to their short-term interest to mimic 
conventional bankers’ behavior in order to cut cost and maximize volume.   
 
                                                             
1 Faculty of Islamic Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar, P. O. Box 34110 Doha 
Qatar. Email: mabid.al.jarhi@gmail.com 
346                                          Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance, Vol. 2(1), March 2014             
 
 
We therefore attempt to structure a theory of Islamic banking regulation that 
enhances its advantages for the benefit of the whole finance system. Our guide is to 
motivate Islamic bankers to behave as if they have internalized all the advantages of 
Islamic finance to their benefits. This would eventually be to their long-term 
advantage, as well as to reaching macroeconomic efficiency.  
 
The Emergence of Islamic Banks 
 
Theoretically, financial intermediaries emerge endogenously to confront 
financial market imperfections arising from asymmetric information (Freixasand 
Santomero, 2002). 
 
Have Islamic banks and financial institutions emerged endogenously? 
Historically, Islamic banks and financial institutions have emerged in the private 
sector not only without government intervention, but also despite unfavorable 
regulation that resisted their emergence2. However, the superior ability to deal with 
information asymmetry relative to conventional finance came to be known later on 
(Al-Jarhi, 2001). 
 
Since regulation changes the information environment (Stiglitz, 1994), it can 
hinder or facilitate the emergence and development of Islamic banking and financial 
institutions. Countries whose laws provide unequal treatment of Islamic finance had 
to change their legal and regulatory environment before Islamic banks and financial 
institutions could emerge3. In addition, regulation can prevent Islamic banking to the 
extent that it cannot reach its potential. For example, regulating Islamic banks in 
exactly the same manner as conventional banks deprive them from their comparative 
advantage in treating information asymmetry compared to conventional banking.   
 
Market Imperfections and Regulation 
 
Four alternative theories have developed to explain why banks exist in 
response to these financial market imperfections(Freixasand Santomero, 2002).  
                                                             
2Few exceptions can be mentioned in this regard. The Islamic development bank was founded jointly 
be several member countries of the OIC. Kuwait Finance House was established by the government of 
Kuwait. An Islamic finance system started in Sudan and Iran with the initiative of their respective 
governments. 
3Examples are the UK, Singapore, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia. The legal environment includes 
banking, commercial and financial market laws that define Islamic finance contracts as well as 
customized regulations. 
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Let us consider the implications of each for Islamic banking.  
 
Screening of Potential Borrowers 
 
Conventional banks screen potential clients ex ante on behalf of depositors), 
either because they are better at screening (Grossman and Stiglitz,1980), or on behalf 
of a large number of interested parties(Campbell and Kracaw, 1980). In both cases, 
banks enjoy economies of scale in monitoring (Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1983). 
 
In Islamic finance, there is a need as well as an incentive for Islamic banks to 
screen finance users. 
 
In financing consumption, consumers “compete” for the commodities by 
expressing their willingness to purchase each at a price or a markup over cost that is 
commensurate with their marginal value in use as well as their time preference related 
to each commodity. Competition would result in an equilibrium that equates the price 
of each with its marginal value in use. Screening would therefore depend on the 
bidding by each customer in addition tothe ability of each commodity financed to 
serve as collateral. 
 
The issue of how much finance to allocate to each commodity is resolved 
through a process that invokes its value in use as well as the commodity time 
preference. Both Islamic and conventional finance benefit from the existence of 
economies of scale in screening consumers seeking finance. Islamic banks would also 
have a comparative advantage in screening sale finance customers than conventional 
banks in screening borrower because of the virtual non-existence of information 
asymmetry in the case of Islamic finance. 
 
Regulation must therefore be directed to establishing procedures for Islamic 
sale finance that would properly use the financed commodities as collateral until full 
repayment is concluded.  
 
In addition, procedures for penalizing delinquency and verifying temporary 
insolvency must be established.  
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Screening investors is a process that goes beyond the verification of the ability 
to pay. Investors, whether they obtain finance through sale, Ijarah or partnership (in 
product or profit), must prove their investment feasibility, which influences the ability 
to recover the finance they obtain. In this respect, regulation of Islamic banks must 
ascertain that they are properly equipped with the abilities to prepare, review 
feasibility studies, and monitor investments made through partnership and Wakala. 
 
Monitoring Banks and Customers 
 
Banking theory focuses on the monitoring of borrowers’ actions after loan 
approval. Models here have concentrated on one of the following (Freixasand 
Santomero, 2002). 
 
1. The actual use of borrowed funds (Boot and Thakor, 1993),  
2. Effort involved (Allen and Gale, 1988), and  
3. Ex post outcome revelation (Diamond, 1984, Gale and Hellwig, 1985). 
 
In this context, Islamic finance monitoring of finance users’ actions during the 
use of finance takes a different form. In partnership finance, an Islamic bank or 
financial institution, in its capacity as partner, and being part of the management, 
information flows automatically into its hands. The finance providershould ascertain 
that the finance user is properly equipped to collect and disseminate necessary 
information. 
 
In sale finance, an Islamic bank or finance institution would provide 
commodities, not cash, to the finance user. Therefore, there is no need to worry 
about “how funds are used.” What remains is that the financier must ascertainthrough 
maintenance and insurance contracts that the use of commodities provided would not 
be contrary to their use as collateral4. 
 
The question of how the fund users use funds after obtaining finance arises 
only in the cases of Mudaraba and Wakala, both unrestricted and restricted. 
Therefore, it becomes necessary for Rabbulmal to insure against encroachment, 
negligence and violation of contract. Regulations can set suitable guidelines for 
Mudaraba and Wakala, including the following. 
                                                             
4 Consequently, an Islamic financial institution has direct interest in refusing to finance commodities 
for those who obtain finance for liquidity purposes, i.e., purchase goods for immediate resale, or 
Tawarruq. The fact that financed goods serve as collateral would not allow such behavior. 
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1. Making a feasibility study to estimate the expected or indicative rate of return, by 
whose figures and results the finance user must be bound, except for changes that 
occur for reasons beyond his powers. In such case, the burden of proof falls 
squarely on his/her shoulder. 
2. The investment agent (Mudareb, managing partner, or Wakeel) must hold orderly 
bookkeeping and supply audited financial statements. 
3. The investment agent must supply regular reports (monthly or quarterly) 
containing the information necessary for proper monitoring. 
4. Control of payables and receivables of financed operation through an account with 
the bank or finance institution, where inward and outward movements would be 
approved by both the financier and the finance user. 
5. To avoid such costly procedures, Mudaraba and Wakala could be joined with 
Musharaka. Regulations should therefore accept that as a substitute for the above 
procedure. 
 
When it comes to monitoring banks by customers, we find that the incentive 
to monitor “one’s bank” is rather week in conventional banking. This is because all 
deposits are guaranteed, both principal and interest.  
 
In Islamic banks, investment accounts are held under the rules of 
Mudaraba5and are not guaranteed. Consequently, they face the risk of moral hazard 
whose reduction requires monitoring. Investment account holders would have a 
strong incentive to monitorIslamic banks, but have no effective way to do so. 
Regulation may fill out this gap by Providing access to investment account holder to 
monitoring Islamic banks through enforcing a governance rule that appoints some of 
the holders’ with highest account balances as representatives to the board of directors. 
 
The rationale for such representation is that investment accounts face the 
same risks as shareholding in the bank. 
 
How much representation should be accorded to them? Proportional 
representation would make account holders a majority in the banks’ boards of 
directors.  
 
 
                                                             
5 Some also can be held under Musharaka and Wakala, which would equally require monitoring. 
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Meanwhile, considering that some of these accounts are transitory, regulations 
can set a criterion that considers both account size and maturity for eligibility to sit on 
the board.  
 
Liquidity Risk Insurance 
 
The justification of providing guaranteed deposits, offered by Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), assumes uncertainty of consumptiontiming.Banking contractsallow for 
some ex ante insurance. Despite the possible instability of banks,their guaranteed 
deposit contracts are preferred to financial securities (McCulloch, 1986). 
 
Conventional banks place proceeds from demand deposits into loans, which 
are salable at a loss. This creates maturity mismatch.  
 
Islamic banks do accept demand deposits like conventional banks. Their 
assets, too, have longer maturity than their demand deposits and investment accounts. 
They have more tools to use in bridging the maturity gap than conventional finance. 
In particular, they can apply the following methods: 
 
1. The use of restricted investmentaccounts, based on restricted Mudaraba or Wakala, 
to attract funds directed to financing certain projects or portfolios with maturities 
longer than available through unrestricted investment accounts. 
2. Securitization of long-term projects, portfolios and syndicated finance into Sukuk 
of long maturities to attract funds with longer maturities. 
3. Securitizing investment accounts into Mudaraba and investment WakalaSukuk of 
various maturities in order to make themliquid to depositors. Trading investment 
account Sukuk will allow investment account holders to exit without 
depositwithdrawal. 
 
Sukuk transfers the title to the securitized assets from banks to Sukuk holders, 
which provides an effective way to match maturities. 
 
Conventional finance does not have access to attracting restricted Wakala and 
Mudaraba accounts. Their use of securitization of some of their assets does not 
change titles to the assets to security holders. Conventional banks will remain stuck 
with the title to their assets. Maturity mismatching relief would therefore be limited. 
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Regulations must therefore set rules for the holders of restricted investment 
accounts in order to allow them some monitoring rights with regard to the projects, 
funds or portfolios in which they invest. In addition, proper procedures must be set 
for securitization into Sukuk, in order to insure that Sukuk holders control the special 
purpose and the true sale of securitized assets to insure their title transfer to Sukuk 
holders. In addition, regulations must set proper rules for trading such Sukuk in 
primary and secondary markets in coordination between monetary and financial 
market regulators. 
 
Creating a Safe Asset 
 
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990, 1993) consider banks as an optimal security 
design. Bank deposits provide an investment in a safe asset, which is not affected by 
information in the financial markets and is a feasible, efficient asset in optimal 
portfolio decisions. 
 
Yet, such security leads to concentration of risk in the hands of few 
specialists. When deposits are guaranteed by banks, (Tovar, Jaramillo and Hernández, 
2011), banks react to higher risk bytransferring a larger share of risk to customers 
throughhigher interest rates. In times ofcrises, the increased vulnerability of the 
system leads banksto fear a run on them started by one of the banks going bankrupt. 
Financial crisis reduces banks’incentives to compete acts instead as acoordinating 
signal for collusion. 
 
Islamic banks guarantee only demand deposits. A share of the risk is 
shouldered by investment account holders in proportion to the funds they keep in 
their accounts. During financial crises6, the riskborne by Islamic banks and investment 
account holders increase.  
 
Islamic banks do not shift part of their risk to investment account holders by 
reducing their profit-sharing ratio. In order to maintain competitive profit rates on 
investment accounts, Islamic banks may decrease shareholders profit-sharing ratio in 
favor of their customers.  
                                                             
6 Financial crises can strike Islamic finance in mixed financial systems. In a purely Islamic finance 
system, the possibility of crises is removed by the virtue of the absence of risk trading and strong 
binding of the financial with the real sector.  
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Other cushioning devices are used, like withdrawal from the profit 
stabilization reserve and the investment risk reserve in order to prop up the profit rate 
distributed to investment accounts.   
 
Regulations should maintain such cushions and make sure that Islamic banks 
provide a rate of return on investment accounts that is higher than the interest rate 
paid by conventional banks on time and saving depositsto compensate investment 
account holders for the extra risk they take in financing real economic activities 
instead of providing collateralized loans7. 
 
Banks’ Incentives to Monitor and Asset Safety 
 
The quality of banks assets depends upon their incentive to monitoring. 
Optimality requires Pareto optimal incentives for banks to screen monitor and invest. 
With incorrect incentives, market failures will occur in the absence of bank regulation, 
reducing social welfare and real economic activity(Gertler, 1988). Conventional banks 
incentives to monitor borrowers would require special regulations, as they do not 
come naturally through market mechanism. Lack of incentives to monitor emanate 
from conventional banks’ insistence to take no business risk whatsoever, except the 
risk on collateral. In addition, holders of demand and time deposits with conventional 
banks have little incentive to monitor their banks, as their deposits are guaranteed in 
principal and interest.  
 
The safety of assets held by Islamic banks will generally depend on their 
underlying Islamic investment and finance contracts, investment feasibility and 
safeguards to insure transparency and disclosure. 
 
Islamic banks practice indicates their preference to sale over partnership 
finance. Sale finance is free from information asymmetry and requires no monitoring8. 
 
The choice of the underlying Islamic investment and finance contracts 
provide Islamic banks a unique opportunity to create assets with self-mitigated risk.  
                                                             
7The nominal rate of growth of the economy could be used as a benchmark to the rate of return on 
investment. If an Islamic bank is not distributing the benchmark as minimum, its operations should be 
scrutinized to check whether the Islamic bank in question is placing some of its resources in 
conventional outlets.   
8 One exception needs to be mentioned, that banks must prohibit resale of financed assets before 
finance repayment, without permission from the financing bank, in order to make sure that the quality 
of their collateral will not deteriorate due to premature sale. 
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There is a menu of fifteen investment and finance contracts from which to 
choose. Each contract has a different degree of embedded risk. Mixing and matching 
contracts, or what is common as product structuring, can be an effective method to 
sculpture quality assets. Joining Mudaraba or Wakala with Musharaka in one product 
would significantly reduce information asymmetry and its related risks9.  Risks of 
Musharaka itself can be mitigated through joining it with Ijarah. The size of the menu 
of Islamic investment and finance contract indicates that the number of products can 
go into several hundreds.  
 
Such advantage in Islamic finance may require proper regulation. Islamic 
bankers, interested in short-term objectives and being unable to internalize the 
external benefits of Islamic finance may, likeconventional bankers shy away of using 
certain contracts, like Mudaraba and Musharaka. Therefore, regulators have to make 
sure that Islamic banks under their supervision use the art of product structuring to its 
full potential. 
 
This can be handled through considering that failure to use product 
structuringeffectively can be a source of operating risk. Regulations must therefore 
ascertain that each Islamic bank has sufficient resources and proper procedures to do 
so. In addition, supervision should review samples of previous structures to test for 
their propriety and their ability to fulfill customer objectives and bank goals. 
 
Market Failures and Regulation 
 
There are three sources of market failure, the presence of public goods, 
externalities and monopolies (market power). 
 
Public Goods and Regulations 
 
The banking and finance system itself renders benefits to all citizens once 
established, like the provision of a means of exchange and the use of monetary policy 
in order to gauge monetary growth to the requirements of economic growth and to 
control inflation. There is no way to apply the exclusion principle to citizens. Taxes 
must be used to finance such activities.  
 
                                                             
9 Notice the similarity of this approach with that used by universal banks (Al-Jarhi, 2001). 
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Does banking and finance in general contain an element of public goods that 
justify its regulation? Would that apply to both conventional and Islamic finance 
equally? How would regulation provide a reasonable solution to the public good 
problem in both cases? These are the questions we would like to look into. 
 
Public good elements in conventional finance are elaborated in Appendix II.  
 
1. The public good elements in Islamic banking 
 
The Islamic banking and finance system would have the same elements of 
public goods as its conventional counterpart, namely the provision of a means of 
exchange and monetary policy. In contrast to conventional finance, Islamic finance 
has a much lower share of public bads, as seen below. 
 
 Islamic banking and finance, properly applied allocates resources according to 
investmentrather than lending criteria. The finance system would therefore be 
sustainable and compact. 
 An Islamic bank or financial institution has no guaranteed liabilities, with the 
exception of demand deposits. Compared with the presence of risks associated 
with its assets, it appears to be more stable than a conventional bank or financial 
institution. In addition, sale finance (provision of commodities on credit) 
automatically provides for sufficient collateral. Asset creation by Islamic banks 
would therefore involve an element of risk self-mitigation that is not automatically 
available to conventional finance. 
 Return on Islamic banks investment accounts is not guaranteed, providing no 
incentive to substitute real resources for cash in transactions. The system would 
therefore stay efficient. 
 Eleven out of the fifteen Islamic finance contracts enjoy information asymmetry 
between finance providers and users. Only Mudaraba and Wakala (restricted and 
unrestricted are subject to information symmetry.  
Their use in conjunction with Musharaka would be an inexpensive way to provide 
perfect monitoring. 
 
 Islamic finance is prohibited from innovating through risk trade. Innovation comes 
as a result of introducing new contracts or mixing and matching of the existing 
fifteen contracts. An important source of instability is removed, hence.  
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However, innovation can lead to finance products of ill repute10. They would 
be instrumental in converging the Islamic finance system to conventional finance, 
thereby depriving the former from important comparative advantages. 
 
 The rise of large banking unitsin societies using Islamic finance is still possible. 
Whether this can be used to support the claim that such large banks are too big to 
fail, will depend on the game-theoretic structure of the political system. However, 
using tax money to provide fund users with temporary illiquidity during 
crisesthrough debt rescheduling instead of directly subsidizing banks would prove 
more effective in avoiding both recessions and bank failures simultaneously. 
 
2. Regulation as a Solution to the Public Good Problem in Banking 
 
2.1. Regulation by itself cannot remove the public bads described above from the 
system of conventional banking and finance. They turn to be systemic ills that 
require modifying the system. 
 
2.2. Regulation can help Islamic finance in the following areas: 
 
2.2.1. Placing guidelines for the use of Amana finance (Musharaka, Mudaraba and 
Wakala) in order to facilitate the use of the latter two, especially in conjunction 
with the former. Such guidelines would reduce the extent of information 
asymmetry imbedded in Mudaraba and Wakala11. 
 
2.2.2. To prevent products of ill repute, regulations must clearly define all Shari'ah 
compliant and currently prevalent non-compliantproducts and establish a Shari'ah 
Fatwa and supervisory board in the regulatory agency, while doing away with 
Shari'ah boards in each Islamic bank.  
 
                                                             
10 Finance products of ill repute result when Islamic banks attempt to use conventional finance 
products after dressing them into an Islamic garb, like 'Einah, Tawarruq, and products based on the 
sale of debt. 
11Such guidelines would include the use of feasibility studies by whose figures and results the finance 
user would be bound, orderly and audited bookkeeping, supply of finance providers with regular 
reports, channeling cash flows from financed activities through an account with the finance provider. 
Forcing the finance user to guarantee both principal and return in cases of encroachment, negligence 
and violations of contract conditions, and finally placing the burden of proof on the shoulders of 
finance users. 
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The presence of a Shari'ah board within the monetary authority with 
regulatory and supervisory powers would then be sufficient. Definitions of Shari'ah 
permissible and non-permissible products may also have to be added to commercial 
and financial market laws. 
 
2.2.3. Regulations can prohibit providing subsidies to banks that face bankruptcy 
risks. Instead, regulators would offer assistance to customers who face temporary 
insolvency at times of crises. In addition, heavy penalties should be imposed on 
delinquent finance users. 
 
Externalities 
 
2.3.  Forced Wealth Redistribution 
 
In conventional finance, banks as monopolies are allowed by law to create 
moneycollectively in the form of derivative deposits. This imposes an externality on 
the non-banking public. Money collectively created by banks is lent to customers at an 
interest rate. Charging interest on lending is rationalized by the fact that money has 
transactions services. Yet, such services emanate from the fact that money is generally 
accepted as means of exchange by the public. The reward for general acceptability, 
which is the source of monyness, does not go to the public. It goes to banks instead. 
Therefore, conventional banks force a redistribution of wealth to their favor through 
their lending activities. 
 
Regulation has only one way to internalize such externality to the benefit of 
the whole society. Regulators, through the enforcement of total reserves, give the 
monopoly of issuing money total and complete to the monetary authority. However, 
this may be necessary but not sufficient. Guidelines must be set on the proper 
disposal of signorage gained by the central bank.   
 
2.4. Forced Hidden Taxation 
 
In conventional banking, the central banks issues the monetary base against 
government debt. The interest paid by the government to the central bank on its debt 
returns to the government in the form of central bank surplus.  
 
This means that the government obtains free financial resources at the 
expense of the whole society.  
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The cost of such resources would be a hidden tax that facilitates government 
expansion at the expense of the private sector, similar to the crowding effect. 
 
Additional transparency rules can be introduced. Government budget should 
add all items of signorage to “non-tax revenues” for which the government would be 
accountable. 
 
In Islamic finance, the government would not be allowed to borrow from the 
central bank. Instead, it would have to obtain financing for its economic activities by 
using the Shari'ah-compliant finance contracts. The central bank can add to the 
monetary base by issuing money against financial instruments based on such 
contracts. It would gain profits from holding such instruments, which would be 
considered signorage whose disposal would be subject to transparency rules. The 
central bank surplus is balanced by providing finance to the government through 
market mechanism and on equal basis to the private sector. 
 
Market Power 
 
Banks gain monopoly power through licensing. In addition, the banking 
system becomes a price setter, as central banks set the rates of interest, which are used 
as bases for pricing loans. Conventional banks income on lending comes from the 
interest differential thatmay not change much with the level of interest rates set by the 
central bank12. The cost of funds is not therefore, market determined. This introduces 
an element of inefficiency to the finance system. 
 
Lifting the central bank control on interest rates would not be acceptable. 
Interest rates are considered an important policy tool that central banks would not 
conceivably yield. 
 
In Islamic banking and finance, funds are provided, through the provision of 
goods and services on credit, as well as through partnerships. The rate of return on 
financing is market determined.  
                                                             
12 Banks would put a markup on the central bank or prime rate to calculate the borrowing rates paid on 
deposits. They add the interest rate differential to the borrowing rate in order to arrive at the lending 
rate. Assisted by monopoly power, banks could set the interest rate differential as a percentage of the 
central bank or prime rate. Raising that rate under this scenario would mean a higher differential in 
absolute terms. The total income from bank lending will ultimately depend on its volume. 
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Monetary policy is exercised exclusively through changing the monetary base 
and open market operations in Shari'ah-compliant financial instruments.Investment 
certificates issued by Treasury, central bank, member banks and business enterprises 
are classifiable by their underlying Islamic finance contracts. It is theoretically possible 
that the central bank would attempt to set markup, rental and profit rates through 
open market operations in each kind of certificates. This would be too laborious. The 
control of money supply would require trading certain value of certificates for each 
targeted level of monetary base. Selective trading by underlying contracts would not 
be necessary. 
 
Regulation can enforce the competitiveness of Islamic banking and finance by 
reducing restrictions on entry and complete avoidance of setting rates of return on 
either investment accounts or financing provided by banks. 
 
Aggregate Liquidity 
 
Cost of  Monetary Liquidity  
 
Aggregate liquidity has become the responsibility of the central bank. This 
justifies its monopoly over money creation (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). This 
assigns the systemic stability role to the central bank. 
 
The need for the central bankto regulate the financial sector comes from the 
role played by conventional banks in asset transformation. They have illiquid assets 
and allegedly liquid liabilities. While economists consider deposits as money, Fama 
(1980) asserts that bank deposits are notliquid, but they are private contracts with 
different levels of risk. This compares with the basic principle that liquidity applies 
only to demand deposits in Islamic banks. Investment accounts are not the parallel 
product to time and saving deposits. They are based on Mudaraba. They can also be 
based on Musharaka and Wakala. Therefore, the concept of asset transformation 
takes a different twist in Islamic banking. 
 
The role of the central bank, as a regulator and as responsible for aggregate 
liquidity may be different in the case of Islamic finance. Such responsibility will 
usually depend on whether banks are allowed to produce collectively derivative 
deposits through the imposition of fractional reserves.  
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In addition, the “liquidity” created by Islamic banks may have a different 
effect on the price level due to the fact that Islamic finance does not finance the 
demand side only, but extends its finance to both the demand and supply sides. 
Finally, the regulation of Islamic banking on the basis of “supervising liquidity”  
would required the regulator or the central bank to act asthe ultimate “fund provider”, 
a role that is similar to that of the “ultimate lender” in conventional banking. We will 
take up each one of the three points below. 
 
Derivative Deposits in Islamic Banking 
 
When an Islamic finance provides Musharaka, Mudaraba or Wakala finance, it 
places some of the capital provided as a demand deposit into the finance user’s 
account13. Finance users, once received the funds, they will start spending on their 
investment activities to purchase factors of production. The flows therefrom to 
owners of such factors will restart another cycle of flows to other persons. When 
Islamic banks provide sale finance, cash is added to the demand deposits of 
commodity suppliers. 
 
If all such flows or most of them end up in Islamic banks accounts14, banks 
will use the full value of the new balances placed in investment accounts to finance 
more assets in the Mudaraba pool. New balances in demand deposits will be similarly 
used, depending on the required reserve ratio applied on such deposits. The use of 
new balances in investment as well as demand deposits will cause successive rounds 
of derivative deposits both as investment accounts and as demand deposits. 
 
The Effects of  Money Creation by Islamic Banks on Prices 
 
From above, we realize that Islamic banks are capable, as a group, of adding 
to the supply of money through derivative deposits. Banks use balances over and 
above their liquidity as well as required reserve requirements to invest and add to their 
assets. 
 
                                                             
13 This does not happen in all cases. The bank may provide some or all capital in kind, but this must be 
evaluated at the prices prevailing at the start of the partnership finance. 
14 In a multiple finance system (conventional and Islamic), some funds will flow out of Islamic into 
conventional banks and vise versa. 
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Islamic banks invest through providing finance in the forms of partnership, 
Wakala, or sale finance. In partnership cases, finance goes to increase the supply of 
commodities. In the rest, finance goes to demand and supply sides. Most sale finance 
directs itself to suppliers before reaching demand. When a firm wishes to finance the 
acquisition of machinery and equipment, an Islamic bank would acquire such 
commodities first before selling or leasing them to the firm. Therefore, supply is 
reached before demand. In conclusion, the increase in Islamic finance investments 
due to money (derivative-deposit) creation would have no significant effect on 
inflation. This is contrary to conventional finance which is mostly directed to demand 
and can easily be inflationary. 
 
The phenomenon of collective money creation by conventional banks and its 
effect on the price level, the cost of real balances and wealth redistribution against the 
public and in favor of banks would justify regulations in favor of total reserves. 
Collective money creation by Islamic banks may have less influence on the price level 
and the cost of real balances, but would still have the same redistributive effects in 
favor of banks. The enforcement of total reserves would still be in order. Meanwhile, 
more transparency is required in the government use of signorage.   
 
The Ultimate Fund Provider 
 
Should the monetary authority claim final responsibility for the aggregate 
liquidity of the economy, it must stand ready to play the role of the last fund provider 
to banks. However, the role of the lender of the last resort does not seem to 
applyequally to Islamic banking. The reason is that most central banks regulating and 
supervising Islamic banks in a mixed financial system do not have the tools to act as 
the ultimate liquidity provider to Islamic banks.  
 
Central banks perform the function of the ultimate lender through a single 
conventional means. Through the discount window, banks requiring extra liquidity 
can discount some of their government-debt holdings. This would be strictly Shari'ah 
noncompliant.  The remedy is that the government or central banks issues Shari'ah 
compliant investment certificates (e.g., Mudaraba certificates) whose proceeds are 
invested either directly or through Islamic banks. Banks holding such certificates 
would sell them in the open market or to the central bank to obtain liquidity relief. 
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Conclusions 
 
Islamic banks has several advantages over conventional finance especially in 
the areas of information asymmetry, efficiency and stability. Most of such advantages 
are reflected as external effects in the form of macroeconomic and long run benefits. 
Islamic bankers, failing to internalize such benefits have little incentive to strictly 
adhere to the Islamic finance paradigm. Regulations are therefore required to change 
such behavior in a way to allow the economy to reap the benefits of Islamic finance.  
 
Regulation that ignores the special characteristics of Islamic finance would 
hinder the growth of Islamic banks and deprive them from their comparative 
advantage in handling finance relative to conventional banking. 
 
Authorities must seriously consider how differently Islamic banks handle 
market imperfections in order to design their proper regulation. 
 
Both Islamic and conventional banks benefit from economies of scale in 
screening customers.  However, Islamic banks have a comparative advantage in 
screening seekers of consumption finance, because of lack of information asymmetry 
in sale finance. Regulation of Islamic banks must verify the existence of proper 
procedures to offer sale finance and to ascertain the use of financed commodities and 
their availability as collateral until the finance is fully repaid. 
 
Screening investors seeking finance by Islamic banks requires procedures to 
verify investment feasibility. Regulation must ascertain that Islamic banks have the 
capability and resources for such function. 
 
Regulation must insure that banks properly monitor their customers and 
depositors and investment account holders monitor their banks. Islamic banks face 
no information asymmetry in sale and Musharaka finance. The monitoring problem is 
automatically solved, hence. Monitoring partnership finance in Mudaraba and Wakala 
requires procedures to make it less costly. The paper offers such procedures. 
 
Investment account holders in Islamic banks must monitor their banks 
because their accounts, unlike demand deposits, are not guaranteed.  
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Regulations must allow for representing investment account holders on the 
board of directors of Islamic banks in order to reduce the risk of moral hazard. 
Regulation mustset minimum size and maturity requirements for the representation of 
account holders. 
 
Both Islamic and conventional banks face maturity mismatch between assets 
and liabilities. Islamic banks have more tools than conventional banks to close this 
gap. Regulations must therefore make sure that Islamic banks use such tools to the 
extent that maturity mismatch becomes negligible. 
 
Conventional banks face greater business risks than Islamic banks. Time and 
saving deposits in conventional banks are guaranteed, both principal and interest. Risk 
is therefore concentrated in the hands of conventional banks. They tend to shift back 
this risk to customers at times of crises, by charging higher margins on loans. This 
behavior includes a higher degree of coordination between banks at times of crises. 
 
Islamic banks, meanwhile, share risk in proportion to their shareholders 
equity. Investment account holders face risk in proportion to their account balances. 
Risk is therefore distributed more uniformly in Islamic finance. Islamic banks use the 
profit stabilization reserve and the investment risk reserve as cushions during financial 
crises in order to pay a competitive rate of return on investment accounts.  
 
Regulation must ascertain the build up of sufficient cushions during good 
times and their proper use during adversity. They must also make sure that the rate of 
return on investment accounts is sufficiently higher than the interest rate paid on time 
and saving deposits, to compensate for the higher risk taken in financing real 
economic activities rather than providing collateralized loans. 
 
While regulation must provide Islamic banks with procedures to tighten their 
monitoring of Mudaraba and Wakala investment, the quality of their assets hinges 
upon product structuring in order to benefit from the risk mitigation advantages of 
the majority of Islamic finance contracts. Regulation must therefore make sure that 
the internal processes include product structuring. Product structures must be tested 
internally for both business viability and Shari'ah compliance.  
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Regulation can help Islamic finance deal with the public goods problem. It 
can set guidelines for the use of Amana finance (Musharaka, Mudaraba and Wakala) 
in order to facilitate their use, especially the latter two in conjunction with the former. 
In order to prevent theproducts of ill repute, regulations must clearly define all 
Shari'ah compliant and non-compliant products and establish a Shari'ah Fatwa and 
supervisory board in the regulatory agency, while doing away with Shari'ah boards in 
each Islamic bank 
 
Regulations can prohibit providing subsidies to Islamic banks that face 
bankruptcy risks. Instead, regulators should offer assistance to customers who face 
temporary insolvency. In addition, heavy penalties should be imposed on delinquent 
customers.   
 
In Islamic finance, the government would have to obtain finance for its 
economic activities by using the Shari'ah-compliant finance contracts. The central 
bank signorage is balanced by providing finance to the government through market 
mechanism on equal basis with the private sector and enforcing transparency and 
disclosure rules on the signorage use by Treasury. 
 
The role of the central bankto protect aggregate liquidity depends on whether 
banks are allowed to produce collectively derivative deposits through the imposition 
of fractional reserves. The “liquidity” created by Islamic banks may have a different 
effect on the price level due to the fact that Islamic finance does not finance the 
demand side only, but extends its finance to both the demand and supply sides. 
Finally, the regulation of Islamic banking based on “supervising liquidity” would 
require the regulator or the central bank to properly equip itself to act asthe ultimate 
“fund provider”; a role that is similar to that of the “ultimate lender” in conventional 
banking.  
 
Appendix I: comparative advantages of Islamic finance 
 
The classical loan contract boils down to selling present for future cash at an agio 
(premium) reflecting the time preference in cash. It suffers from serious information 
asymmetry, as the lender and the borrower are not equally informed about the use of loaned 
funds. The lender would have to exercise costly monitoring of the borrower’s use of funds. 
As a substitute, the lender finds it less expensive to take sufficient collateral.  
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Islamic finance has fifteen finance contracts. Six of which provide commodities 
against future payment or spot payment against their future delivery15. They involve a 
premium that reflects time preference in commodities. Such contracts are free from 
information asymmetry. Both the finance provider and user are equally informed about the 
use of advanced funds. Five of the Islamic finance contracts involve partnership in either 
profit or product in addition to management16. They are similar to equity finance and are 
equally free from information asymmetry. Two of Islamic finance contracts involve sharing in 
profit without management17. Two more contracts are based on investment agency18. 
Obviously, the last four contracts suffer from information asymmetry in a manner similar to 
the classical loan contract.  
 
Islamic finance can be described as the art of product structuring. This will be 
explained further when asset safety is examined. 
 
Another important advantage of Islamic finance is macroeconomic efficiency. 
Conventional banking take saving and time deposits, which are loans that are guaranteed both 
principal and interest. Such guarantee entices people to substitute real resources for cash in 
transactions. Withdrawal of real resources from the real to the monetary sector brings 
aggregate output below optimum.  Islamic banks take investment accounts based on PLS, where 
neither principal nor return is guaranteed. The absence of guarantee in this case leaves no 
incentive to substitute real resources for cash in transactions. The aggregate output stays 
optimum, hence(Al-Jarhi, 2001). 
 
The advantages of Islamic finance include bank stability, based on the structure of 
their balance sheets, high incentive to monitor banks by customers and vise versa, and a 
preference to assist customers who become temporarily illiquid, while punishing delinquency, 
which if not hindered can make bank failures a thing of the past.  
 
Appendix ii: The Public Good Element in Conventional Banking 
 
If we excluded the mere existence of the financial system as a whole, financing 
services provided by banks are not pure public goods, as the exclusion principle is easily 
applied in conventional finance. Finance is provided, based on creditworthiness and collateral. 
In addition, the conventional banking system is associated with some public bads.  
                                                             
15 Bai' Bethaman Ajel (deferred payment sale), Murabaha (sale at cost plus a markup), Istisna' (sale of 
goods to be manufactured by specifications), Salam (spot payment against delivery of specified goods), 
Ijarah (sale of services or usufruct), and Ijarah Muntahia Bettamleek (sale of both usufruct, and 
underlying asset against installments).   
16 Musharaka (equity finance), diminishing Musharaka, Muzara’a (sharecropping), Mugharassa (sharing 
in horticulture by planting trees), and Mussaqah (sharing in horticulture by irrigating and mending).   
17 Restricted and unrestricted Mudaraba (profit and loss sharing, PLS, with no role in management. 
18 Restricted and unrestricted Wakala (investment agency). 
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Those result from lending at a rate of interest(Al-Jarhi, 2001).  
 
 Finance through the classical loan contract causes the allocation of resources to be based on 
“lending criteria” rather than “investment criteria” (Al-Jarhi, 2001). It causes the financial 
system to suffer from non-sustainability and lack of compactness. 
 A conventional bank or financial institution is inherently unstable. Its liabilities are 
guaranteed both principal and rate of interest, while its assets are subject to default risk. 
 A positive interest rate, guaranteed to be paid on loans encourages the substitution of real 
resources for money in transactions, thereby reducing efficiency.  
 Information asymmetry exposes commercial banking to risks of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Mitigation of such risks require expensive monitoring or the switch from 
commercial to universal banking (Al-Jarhi, 2005).  
 Financial innovations through the use of risk trading exposes the economy to instability and 
contagion. 
 In a democracy with imperfect information, bank size becomes a critical element in 
economic policy, giving rise to the claim that some banksaretoo big to fail. Policymakers tend 
to draw taxpayers’ money to subsidize them during crises (Al-Jarhi, 2009). 
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